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The Functions of Literature and the  
Evolution of Extended Mind
Nancy Easterlin
Given the current climate of higher education, the question of the usefulness of literature is pressing. As the United States moves inexorably toward a practical notion of the university’s mis-
sion, all of the humanities, and perhaps most particularly arts-centered 
disciplines in state-funded systems, have to fight for their survival. Without 
doubt, this is, at present, a losing battle. However, the urgency of this 
matter may obscure the fact that conceptions of literature’s use have 
varied considerably, not only over several thousand years of aesthetic 
theory, but within the much shorter span—about a hundred and fifty 
years—of the institutionalization of literary studies. According to Gerald 
Graff, “The typical American college [in the early nineteenth-century] 
was a quasimonastic institution where ‘the preparation of individuals 
for Christian leadership and the ministry’ . . . was considered a more 
important goal than the advancement of knowledge.”1 If university edu-
cation in the first half of the nineteenth century functioned primarily to 
cultivate a male social elite, and if language and literary study thus came 
to serve a central role in reproducing a patriarchal, classist hierarchy, 
those values have, most assuredly, lost luster over time.
Understandably, literary scholars are dismayed by the narrow in-
strumentalism now organizing the agenda of higher education. At the 
same time, glancing back over the formation of English studies, one 
observes that values often utterly divorced from intellectual objectives 
have driven the formation of the field. As values shifted considerably in 
the twentieth century, they formed a catalyst—or are perceived to form 
a catalyst—for the main theoretical movements influencing American 
literary scholarship. Although New Critical methodology was quasi-
scientific, introducing a focus on the literary object through the method 
of close reading, its theoretical expressions encouraged severing the 
text from life and history, in the process reifying nineteenth-century 
spiritual values through insistence on the irreducibility of the organically 
unified work. In reaction to New Criticism’s isolationism, approaches in 
the seventies were influenced by sociopolitical movements, including 
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Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, and, slightly later, ecology. Concur-
rently, those approaches inspired by structuralism and poststructuralism 
particularly stressed the power of language and discourse. Yet in spite of 
this renewed connection between literature and the social sphere and 
the emphasis on its linguistic medium, in recent decades literary studies 
has continued to drift toward the margin of the academy.
The dominance of values as a motivating factor for theoretical and 
critical developments also harks back to institutional origins, because it 
derives from nineteenth-century ambivalence about the place of science 
in the humanities. This ambivalence, and its fundamental expression 
in the culture wars, has not been kind to literary studies.2 Cast as the 
competitor to poetry by the Romantic era, science focuses on different 
objects from literary studies, and thus might likely require different 
methods and goals, but this is no reason to assume that verified scientific 
findings have no epistemic legitimacy in the humanities. In fact, some 
of these findings have direct bearing on the question of literature’s use 
or function. 
Because literature and the other arts are highly complex cultural 
products, their potential for various legitimate uses is great. For present 
purposes, I will narrow my discussion down initially to a consideration 
of the evolved function of art, because attention to the origins of a 
phenomenon typically illuminates the question of its use. Furthermore, 
because evolutionary social science is specifically concerned with the 
function of traits, it compels us to ask: why do we have literature at all? 
The theory of evolution by natural selection is corroborated by fossil 
findings and the study of living organisms. Not all evolutionary hypoth-
eses can be proven, or proven easily, such as those that apply to mind, 
complex behaviors, and cultural artifacts, for which there cannot be 
hard evidence. But the framing hypothesis for these more speculative 
investigations is quite robust. Concerned with survival, evolutionary 
theory focuses on the functional value of species traits, since organisms 
that have the physical, psychical, and behavioral traits “designed” to 
help them operate efficiently in their environments will endure. Traits 
that require significant investments of time and physiological effort, 
such as bipedal locomotion, are “expensive” in evolutionary terms, and 
the puzzle of their selective advantage is particularly intriguing. Art 
behaviors, such as the production, distribution, and consumption of 
literary artifacts, are enormously expensive. Most evolutionary scholars 
take the view that, given their costliness, the arts must contribute to hu-
man survival, although a few propose that art is a by-product of other 
mechanisms and behaviors.3 
If the arts have contributed to human survival over the course of 
evolution, it is likely that they still do so, and if they have had such a 
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fundamental role in the shaping and continuity of our species, then 
the marginalization of literature and other arts today seems grotesquely 
ill-advised. My argument for the central importance of the arts in hu-
man cultural evolution has several stages. Although critics in the past 
two centuries have argued over the usefulness of literature, the longer 
critical tradition evinces a persistent concern with the pragmatic func-
tion of literary art. Attention to the prehistory of aesthetic practices 
reveals that such consideration of function is well placed. The arts, in 
all their diversity of forms, are not mere ornaments braided into the 
evolution of human culture. Rather, they are a central feature of the 
psychological forces propelling its development. Notwithstanding shifts 
in what constitutes “art” and its role in social life since the advent of 
modernization, both the core features and the experience of the aes-
thetic remain surprisingly consistent throughout human prehistory and 
history and manifest themselves as a distinct, special form of the impulse 
shaping culture: the need to control experience as opposed to being 
acted upon by external circumstances. Written literature, compared to 
the other arts, is an extremely recent phenomenon, and it attests to 
the generalized need to shape and control that marks all art. But it is 
also much more than this. As text or film (in book, electronic form, 
or visual media) stored and available for retrieval outside the brain, it 
is a special contribution to external memory and extended mind, one 
that functions to engage us with imaginative interpretations of an ever 
more complex reality.
I
Apprehensions about bringing a scientific perspective to bear on the 
arts have several dimensions. There is, for example, the fear that a his-
tory of applying scientific knowledge to industrial production, which 
emerged about two hundred years ago with utilitarianism as both an 
organized philosophy and emergent cultural attitude, necessarily en-
tails superimposing a mechanistic notion of “utility” on all forms of 
human endeavor. A rationalistic concept of “use” inevitably leads to a 
crude rather than clarifying reductionism, so anxieties that an evolu-
tionary perspective will diminish the arts are hardly trivial.4 However, 
by broadening our view of terms like “function” and “use” beyond a 
limited, rationalistic framework inherited from the Enlightenment, I 
hope to show that a cognitive-evolutionary perspective illuminates the 
significance of art behaviors. Whereas utilitarian philosophy and much 
Enlightenment science are inimical to such behaviors, which can only 
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seem superfluous from a rationalistic perspective, the Enlightenment 
also led paradoxically in an opposite direction, away from reductionism 
and toward a recognition of the operations of chance, complexity, and 
the interrelatedness of phenomena embodied in the theory of evolution 
by natural selection. 
The function or use of literature has, in fact, always been a matter 
of primary concern within the critical tradition. In The Mirror and the 
Lamp, his seminal 1953 study of the critical tradition, M. H. Abrams 
identifies four dominant coordinates of art criticism—the universe, the 
audience, the artist, and the work—each corresponding to a particular 
theoretical emphasis.5 As Abrams demonstrates, although individual 
theories may be placed clearly within one of the four basic categories 
corresponding to these coordinates—mimetic, pragmatic, expressive, 
or objective—no theory or critical approach resides purely within one 
of the four groupings. Each basic tendency is historically related to the 
other three and conditioned by the emphases of preceding theories. 
Moreover, the internal dynamics of any given theory typically account 
for all four coordinates to a certain degree. For instance, although 
Abrams categorizes Samuel Johnson’s theory as predominantly mimetic 
and William Wordsworth’s as expressive, he points out that the Roman-
tic poet “was quite in agreement with Johnson that the poet properly 
concerns himself with the general and uniform elements, passions, and 
language of human nature; he merely differed in regard to the place 
these qualities are best exemplified in real life.”6 Despite divergent views 
about what is the proper object of imitation, and despite an orientation 
toward other coordinates of art behaviors, then, both theories have a 
recognizably mimetic component. 
By the same token, although Wordsworth and other Romantic-era 
poets champion the role of the poet, they generally do so with the 
ultimate goal of producing (or reproducing) a specific effect on the 
audience.7 Since Abrams defines a pragmatic theory as one that “looks 
at the work of art chiefly as a means to an end, an instrument for getting 
something done, and tends to judge its value according to its success in 
achieving that aim,” it might be argued that this typifies Wordsworth’s 
approach as well as Johnson’s.8 The goal or aim of aesthetic engagement, 
in other words, is a primary concern of early criticism. On the whole, 
the emphasis on the poet-as-legislator in Romantic theory led critics to 
mistakenly assume that the movement endorses subjective expression, 
“the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,” for its own sake.9 How-
ever, an attentive reading of Wordsworth’s discussion of the process of 
poetic production reveals that the emotions to be expressed are of value 
because of their universal importance, determined by a poet who has 
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experienced them repeatedly and“[has] thought long and deeply,” and, 
moreover, that the subjects and feelings manifest in the work of such a 
meditative poet are valuable for their capacity to transform the reader. 
Thus, as the poet creates poetry by associating current feelings with the 
ideas resulting from past feelings, “[he] shall describe objects and utter 
sentiments of such a nature and in such connection with each other, 
that the understanding of the being to whom [he addresses himself], 
if he be in a healthful state of association, must necessarily be in some 
degree enlightened, his taste exalted, and his affections ameliorated.”10 
Wordsworth’s emphasis on the reenactment of the poet’s psychological 
process in the reader, in sum, is of a piece with his insistence that the 
poems he presents have a “worthy purpose,” and it is therefore in its 
own way no less aimed at educating the reader than are neoclassical 
perspectives, though the methods of poetical instruction take different 
form. The poet’s stress on psychological process and shaping of the hu-
man psyche as a pedagogical tool—his practice of teaching by indirec-
tion—parallels the rise of psychology as a discipline and simultaneously 
illustrates a modern understanding of how people learn.
All told, granting the differing orientations in aesthetic theories from 
the classical tradition onward, pragmatic considerations nearly always 
come into play. For example, underlying much of the debate about du-
ration and unity of the work from Aristotle up through the eighteenth 
century are differing views of the impact on the audience. Aristotle’s 
preference for tragedy’s shorter span in comparison with the epic and 
his approval of the unities was undergirded by a conviction that drama’s 
cohesive structure produces catharsis, which leads to the ennoblement 
of the individual. Horace turned Aristotle’s observations into rules for 
writing, heightening the emphasis on instruction implicit in the Poetics. 
Similarly attending to the net effect on the audience, Sidney dispar-
aged sixteenth-century England’s bastard form, the “mingled drama” 
(tragicomedy), claiming that the combination of comedy, focused on the 
common errors of human life, and tragedy, focused on the uncertainty 
of human life and invoking admiration and commiseration, produces 
laughter rather than delight. Seventeenth and eighteenth-century English 
critics, although influenced by Pierre Corneille’s rule-oriented sense of 
decorum, relaxed the strict didactic perspective that tied moral instruc-
tion to classical unity. For instance, Dryden’s criticism that the unity 
of place destroys verisimilitude signals a turn away from the rules-and-
models aspect of classical theory and presages Johnson’s emphasis on 
the representation of truth through general nature and variety, which 
he deems conducive to the audience’s moral growth. Different though 
the tenor of the Romantic era may be, Shelley’s insistence that poetry 
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transforms the reader through sympathetic identification with other 
persons underscores a particular impact on the reader, the transforma-
tion of social consciousness.
In the instances cited above, how the audience is affected and what 
ends are served by the purported effects proves a dominant concern of 
the critic. This pragmatic strain throughout the critical tradition, aligned 
with Abrams’s second coordinate, the audience, takes new form with the 
rise of literacy and psychology. Perhaps already emergent in Dryden’s 
preference for verisimilitude, an emphasis on internal audience processes 
gains force in the Romantic era. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
the Russian formalist Shklovsky focused on the psychological impact of 
unusual techniques. And reader response theory takes on new permuta-
tions by the late twentieth century, when scholars like Reuven Tsur and 
Mark Johnson draw on cognitive and evolutionary psychology to explain 
the processes and possible functions of literature. Today, a number of 
cognitive evolutionary theorists assume a continuity between the cogni-
tive processes entailed in, and the evolved function of, literature, for the 
simple reason that basic mental processes must adequately fit the goal 
of long-term survival.11 In sum, a cognitive-evolutionary framework is a 
contribution to the evolving pragmatic strain of criticism and theory, 
connecting internal reader processes with larger hypotheses about the 
function of art at the species level.
II
For several reasons, formulating an evolutionary hypothesis about the 
adaptive function of the arts cannot be a simple business. Evolutionary 
psychology distinguishes between ultimate and proximate causation, that 
is, between the presumed cause of an adaptation in the distant past and 
factors in the current environment that elicit behaviors reflecting that 
adaptation.12 When human settlements took root about 10,000 years ago, 
the advantages and demands of sedentary life accelerated the growth 
of human culture and led to a major, long-term transformation of hu-
man lifeways. In cultural terms, this transformation to modernism was 
gradual, but in evolutionary terms, it was very rapid indeed. Because our 
contemporary manner of living differs so dramatically from that of our 
ancestors as recently as 30,000 years ago, the original and contemporary 
causes of art behaviors are likely to differ.13 
This discrepancy is especially evident when one considers the range and 
kinds of behavior that are included under the rubric of art. Modernized 
human cultures separate the experience of art—art products and the 
667the functions of literature
behaviors they involve—from day-to-day activities, locating them in the 
theatre, the art museum, the opera house, the symphony hall, the dance 
hall, the work of imaginative literature, and so on. Within these various 
arenas, the arts are experienced as activities distinct from those perceived 
to contribute directly to survival. Even today, however, the practice of 
setting artifacts aside for special contemplation, a development of the 
past one thousand years, is confined to very few societies worldwide.14 
By contrast, our species, homo sapiens sapiens, dates to roughly 100,000 
years ago, and estimates of the explosion of human culture pinpoint 
the Middle to Upper Paleolithic Age, between 60,000 and 30,000 years 
ago.15 Over the tens of thousands of years that witnessed the develop-
ment of human culture, art behaviors were not cordoned off into spheres 
removed from everyday, instrumental activities, but were engrained in 
other aspects of human life.
Thus, an evolutionary hypothesis about the emergence of the arts—that 
is, their ultimate cause—must attend to their integral relationship to the 
development of culture. More crucially, such formulations must consider 
whether the patterns of making and experiencing that constitute “the 
aesthetic” encouraged and accelerated cultural evolution as a response 
to problems of survival. If, as the cognitive psychologist Merlin Donald 
defines it, culture is “a collective system of knowledge and behavior” 
that includes ideas, beliefs, myths, artifacts, and institutions, and if we 
agree with those anthropologists and archeologists who identify many 
prehistoric cultural forms as art, then the inextricability of art with 
belief systems, ideologies, and modes of knowing and doing stands in 
relief.16 Some of the best-known material examples of early art include 
body adornments, among them beads (some of those found in France 
were carved to mimic sea shells), animal teeth, and pendants, dating to 
40,000–30,000 years ago; the paintings in Chauvet Cave in the Ardèche 
(30,000 years); the lion-man figurine found in Germany (33,000–30,000 
years ago); the Lascaux Cave paintings (17,000 years); painted slabs in 
southern Africa’s Apollo Cave (27,500 years ago); and wall engravings 
in Australia, dating at least to 15,000 years ago, but perhaps as much as 
40,000 years old.17 Additionally, there is abundant evidence of nonmate-
rial art forms in ritual activities (protomusic, protodance, and, eventually, 
myth), which were combined in holistic, ritual performances rather than 
segmented into separate aesthetic media.
Steven Mithen claims that although evidence of early art appears to 
be more prolific in Europe than elsewhere, it is a worldwide phenom-
enon at this period in human prehistory. Explaining why art remains 
absent in some parts of the world until about 20,000 years ago, Mithen 
writes: “The variability in the intensity with which art was produced can 
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be attributed to variation in economic and social organization, which 
in turn can be largely attributed to environmental conditions. The 
archaeological record shows us that Stone Age art is not a product of 
comfortable circumstances—when people have time on their hands; it 
has most often been created when people were living in conditions of 
severe stress. The florescence of Paleolithic art in Europe occurred at a 
time when environmental conditions were extremely harsh around the 
height of the last ice age.”18 Evolutionary, cognitive, and environmental 
psychologists generally concur with Mithen’s claim that aesthetic phe-
nomena are not related to leisure time but, to the contrary, to stressful 
conditions. If cave paintings were a way of storing information about 
sources of food or rival human groups (a primary source of stress), 
body adornment may have functioned to disseminate messages to such 
groups, perhaps misleading ones. Mithen theorizes that three cognitive 
capacities, related to three domains of mind, are critical for the creation 
of art: the mental conception of an image, intentional communication, 
and attribution of meaning. The emergence of art attests to a transfor-
mation in human cognition, a “cognitive explosion” in early modern 
humans 60,000–30,000 years ago. 
The view that art is a response to challenges to survival harmonizes 
with Donald’s as well as other definitions of the more inclusive term 
“culture.” The environmental psychologists Stephen and Rachel Kaplan 
define culture as a set of consistent patterns for functioning that arises 
from the need to control individual and group life and the surrounding 
environment. Culture is, then, “a collective system of knowledge and 
behavior” that, as Donald emphasizes, functions to extend cognitive 
power and lessen the power of our immediate environment. A cultural 
context does not simply help solve a problem; it helps define the problem 
and shape its solution, providing a coherent understanding and set of 
relationships to other people, physical place, and the larger world. As 
the Kaplans put it, culture is a map for healthy functioning.19 This line 
of thought, then, suggests that culture is much than the product of a 
large brain that frees humans from the demands of a delimited habitat 
and immediate circumstances. Viewed from an evolutionary perspective, 
culture is about enabling control and/or the perception of control, 
thereby also increasing the plasticity of human response. Notably, culture 
is shot through with aesthetic behaviors. Early aesthetic behaviors include 
primitive myths and rituals which, in this light, provide a perception of 
control and explain what is fearful. 
Like these general definitions of culture as a collective system of knowl-
edge and behavior that constitutes a map for functioning, evolutionary 
definitions of “art” and “the aesthetic” emphasize that art is a mode of 
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action rather than a series of categories of artifacts. The most dedicated 
advocate for an evolutionary definition of the arts, the anthropologist 
and art historian Ellen Dissanayake, pointed out in 1988 that it might 
be worthwhile to abandon the term “art” altogether, because this word 
is tied to an artifact-centered approach. Drawing on recent cognitive 
science and philosophy, Dissanayake notes that because classes of things 
don’t have precise boundaries, the quest to define essential features 
of art phenomena is doomed to frustration.20 Dissanayake defines art 
as “making special,” or elaboration beyond the everyday. The human 
need to elaborate beyond, not merely to explain, the everyday imposes 
a human and civilizing order on nature.21 By doing something that 
creates the psychological perception of control, art allays anxiety in 
uncertain circumstances and facilitates group cohesion (although this 
social function may be reduced, masked, or negated in the atomized 
world of modern art practices).
Thus, like the philosopher Denis Dutton, Dissanayake rejects the no-
tion that the origin of the arts requires the separation of ancient and folk 
art behaviors from a modern conception of art. In recognizing difference 
but stressing continuity, both Dissanayake and Dutton identify features 
of art and the aesthetic that they deem key to any efforts to define art. 
Dissanayake itemizes several naturalistic features of aesthetic quality, 
including accessibility coupled with strikingness, tangible relevance, 
evocative resonance, and satisfying fullness.22 Dutton enumerates cross-
cultural features that “define art in terms of a set of cluster criteria,” most 
of which apply to the practices and objects identified as art. Dutton’s 
list is significantly longer than Dissanayake’s, but the two lists exhibit 
marked similarities. Dutton includes direct pleasure, skill and virtuos-
ity, style, novelty and creativity, criticism, representation, special focus, 
expressive individuality, emotional saturation, intellectual challenge, arts 
and institutions, and imaginative experience.23 Both theorists attend to 
the distinctive features of the art object or event as well as the nature 
of the experience it produces. In these accounts, art reveals itself as a 
constructed thing that creates novelty and strikingness through selection 
from the everyday. Art or “making special” is not directly instrumental, 
like digging a trench to prevent flooding inside a settlement or fashioning 
a better weapon, but psychically functional, its evocative concentrations 
of form and style productive of a special emotional response that is of-
ten complemented by criticism and intellectual engagement. Finally, in 
all times and places, art behaviors and objects have been part of larger 
social institutions and practices.
According to this concept of the arts, which maintains that they are 
part of the mental and material apparatus enabling action and control of 
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the immediate environment, the aesthetic is fundamentally continuous 
with other forms of human experience. The orientation toward continuity 
rather than strict demarcation between behaviors and categories coin-
cides with a larger epistemological shift that emphasizes process rather 
than categorization and static hierarchy.24 The transition to a dynamic 
conception of the universe begins in philosophical and scientific thought 
in the eighteenth century, but it gains momentum with the emergence 
of Darwinian theory, which, in surmounting earlier evolutionary theories 
of life through the concept of natural selection, envisioned descent with 
modification as an extraordinarily slow process taking place over vast 
spans of time. Darwin himself points out that the distinction between 
species and variety, although essentially arbitrary, is employed for the 
sake of convenience in grouping similar individuals with one another.25 
The theory of evolution by natural selection profoundly influenced 
American pragmatic philosophy, leading William James and John Dewey 
to criticize the compartmentalization to which intellectual inquiry is so 
often prone.26 Nevertheless, while pragmatists were criticizing the psy-
chological fallacy—that of superimposing discrete functional capacities 
on the mind and segmenting reality into identifiable components such 
as subject, object, and stimulus—the discipline of psychology proceeded 
to develop a stimulus-response model of perception and sensation. 
(After all, phenomena are more amenable to analysis when they are 
broken down into component parts, even when those components 
reflect the thinker’s own perceptual-cognitive apparatus rather than 
mind-independent entities.) Ecological psychology emerged in the 
1960s as a critical response to this trend, claiming that perceptual acts 
can only be understood in the context of the environment, and that 
the senses operating together form a perceptual system designed to 
orient the organism in the environment and facilitate information pick 
up. Thus, J. J. Gibson’s theorization fifty years ago of the relationship 
of perceptual systems to the constraints of the environment serves as 
a precursor to today’s embodiment psychology, which recognizes that 
mental processes are in many ways organized and governed by physical 
patterns of action and applies neuroscientific methods to investigation 
of body-mind processes.27
John Dewey provides an important link between a post-Enlightenment 
epistemology that envisions intellectual inquiry in terms of continu-
ity and process and a functional definition of the aesthetic. Whereas 
experience in general is a continuous process, in Dewey’s estimation, 
“an experience has a unity that gives its name, that meal, that storm, 
that rupture of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted 
by a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of the 
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variation of its constituent parts.”28 Going a step beyond the completed 
unity of an everyday “experience,” Dewey defines “the aesthetic” as the 
clarification and intensification of an ordinary completed experience 
and contends, furthermore, that not only art behaviors but intellectual 
experiences can have an aesthetic quality. Both are subject to an internal 
integration and fulfillment based on movement or aesthetic structure. 
But the arts also differ from a completed, everyday experience. For 
example, watching a spectacular sunset provides a sense of unity and 
completion, but this experience has not been intentionally shaped with 
the goal of eliciting aesthetic response, as has a work of art. In Dewey’s 
words, “The doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of 
such a nature that its qualities as perceived have controlled the question 
of production.”29 And although intellectual experience may be subject 
to such intentionality, it works with abstract signs and symbols rather 
than perceptual qualities, as do the arts. 
III
The arts are, then, intentionally elaborated behaviors that, via some 
kind of product, provide “an experience” through emotionally evoca-
tive stylizations (of visual pattern, rhythm and sound, bodily movement, 
language use, and the like) that reward both creator and participant 
with a perception of control through the combination of accessibility, 
novelty, and completeness. 
In their many instantiations in human prehistory and the present, 
the arts take a variety of distinctive forms. Written literature has several 
unusual characteristics, not least its removal from sense experience. 
Vision and sound are perhaps the senses chiefly engaged in the experi-
ence of the arts, but literary works read silently engage primarily with 
memory rather than linking directly to the senses themselves. Several 
features of literature suggest that, if it still serves an evolved function, 
that function is highly cognitive: its distance from sensory experience, 
its correspondingly abstract, cerebral nature, and its mediation through 
the complex symbolic system of written language.
Viewed as a representative type of art behavior, written literature, an 
extremely recent and cognitively demanding medium, illustrates the 
futility, or perhaps simply the wrong-headedness, of trying to pinpoint an 
ultimate cause for any specific art behavior or object above and beyond 
the propensity to elaborate or “make special.” All of the arts attest to 
the human impulse to resist subjection to external circumstances and 
to occupy instead what John Tooby and Irven DeVore call “the cognitive 
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niche.” This metaphor—the cognitive niche—highlights how the hu-
man development of culture, our “collective system of knowledge and 
behavior,” differentiates us from other animal species. Whereas most 
animal species carve out ecological niches by adapting to distinct habi-
tats, learning to exploit resources and cope with predators in physically 
delimited domains, the greater mobility and intelligence of humans that 
emerged several million years ago freed them from the known threats 
in and dependence on a geographically defined habitat. Able to apply 
intelligence to a changing physical surround, humans learned to turn 
the unfamiliar to good use, crafting their niche in diverse places via the 
benefits of their analytical, interpretive minds. 
The emergence of symbolic systems about nine thousand years ago 
marks, in Donald’s assessment, a major advance in human cognition. 
From the simplest markings on rocks to written text to high-speed com-
puters, humans have created stores of knowledge and information outside 
the brain that greatly enhance use of the environment because they solve 
the problem of limited short-term memory. Knowledge outside the brain 
is stored in the external symbolic storage system (ESS) and constitutes 
“external mind,” that is, a nonbiological extension of human mind into 
the external environment. Donald claims that the symbol systems and 
storage devices of our stage of culture introduce “a hardware change, 
albeit a nonbiological hardware change” in human memory. If this claim 
seems grandiose, imagine trying to function without the ESS. Phonetic 
handwriting, pads and pencils to store that handwriting, computers, 
electronic tablets, telephones—these comprise today some of the more 
obvious forms of external memory. But how would we function without 
streetlights, street signs, traffic signs, and the symbols and words in gro-
cery stores and malls, all of which are components of the ESS? Before 
the development of symbolic systems, external memory was extremely 
limited, including cultural memories “stored” in other persons, early 
arts, trail markings, and so on. The increasing complexity of the ESS is 
evident in the sophistication of a government document, a legal brief, 
or, indeed, a work of literature. Like other documents that benefit from 
the development of phonetic writing, literature attests to the expansion 
and externalization of the mind and at the same time augments a very 
special kind of mental hardware outside the brain. 
What distinctive features of human evolution brought about the 
development of complex culture, including the impulse to elaborate 
beyond the everyday that would, over time, issue in a specific artworld 
comprised of distinct aesthetic media, all attesting to the efflorescence 
of external (or extended) mind? Bipedalism, expansion of group size, 
increase in territory, sociality, high intelligence, meat eating, and, finally, 
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the development of complex language are all dynamically related com-
ponents of the evolution of a species that has learned to use mind and 
the products of mind to make its place in the world. Perhaps the single 
most important adaptation, bipedalism provides benefits and exacts costs 
that drive the evolution of other features of modern humans, includ-
ing increased body, brain, and group size. Outlining Peter Wheeler’s 
hypothesis that bipedalism evolved to reduce heat stress, Robin Dunbar 
points out “that a hairless, bipedal, sweating hominid could have doubled 
the distance it travelled on a pint of water compared to a furred qua-
drupedal one.”30 To the layman, this might sound like a simple savings 
in energy and resources but, in fact, in evolutionary terms, it has major 
implications, since travelling further means confronting the unfamiliar 
which, in turn, demands increased intelligence. Probable migrations 
of homo erectus from Africa and Java into Asia almost two million years 
ago point to the integral relationship between bipedalism and higher 
intelligence. Occurring over vast periods of time, these migrations in-
dicate that individual generations of human ancestors were expanding 
their territory size incrementally and repeatedly relocating into more 
habitable areas. Therefore, two million years ago humans were reaping 
the advantages of bigger brains: with the brainpower to coordinate the 
complex mechanics of bipedal bodies and the attendant ability to travel 
beyond delimited habitats, early humans had begun to occupy the “cog-
nitive niche,” adapting to new locales by taking advantage of unfamiliar 
resources and protecting themselves against new threats. 
Although some late twentieth-century literary theoreticians posit the 
all-encompassing power of language, the supposition that language 
precedes thought and perhaps determines it is fundamentally con-
tradicted by the evidence of evolutionary social science. As Donald 
reasons, significant cognitive and cultural changes likely provided the 
impetus for language’s evolution: “the main importance of the vocal ap-
paratus does not reside in how it might have enabled speech; in itself, 
it couldn’t have. . . . The accompanying conceptual changes are more 
basic, and even these formed only part of a larger cultural change.”31 
Moreover, the dramatic physiological changes necessary for language 
did not emerge under pressure for its evolution, but were probably a 
side benefit of the adaptation for bipedal anatomy.32 Upright posture 
caused the lengthening of the vocal tract with the lower positioning of 
the larynx, consequently enabling increased versatility in vocalizations. 
Donald contends that “The primary objects of language and speech are 
thematic; their most salient achievements are discourse and symbolic 
thought. Words and sentences, lexicons and grammars, would have 
become necessary evils, tools that had to be invented to achieve this 
higher representational goal. In this view, language would have repre-
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sented not an end in itself but an adaptation that met cognitive and 
cultural needs, that is, ultimately for the formalization and unification 
of thought and knowledge.”33 
In sum, Donald suggests that it was the cognitive drive toward repre-
sentation and myth formulation that spurred the evolution of language. 
Mythic representation initially functioned to explain the organization of 
reality, including not only questions of origins but the causes of unpre-
dictable and disastrous events. In drawing the human group together 
by explaining uncertainty, myths addressed the problem of survival and, 
in so doing, consolidated the group through a story that gave a sense 
of psychological control over the environment to individuals as well as 
the group as a whole. 
IV
The complexity of human biological and cultural evolution supports 
the position that a narrowly instrumental view of art is not in keeping 
with an evolutionary perspective, much less with contemporary uses of 
the arts. According to the evolutionary hypothesis presented here, art 
emerged to provide a psychic sense of control and group cohesion in 
uncertain circumstances. In my view, this sense of control, often imparted 
through pattern and immersion in what Dewey identifies as an intention-
ally designed, completed experience, is still a seminal aspect of aesthetic 
experience.34 But this is a far cry from boiling all of art’s functions, not 
to say its uses, down to a perceived control over experience. Art par-
ticipates in culture, and if culture is “a collective system of knowledge 
and behavior” that provides “a map for healthy functioning,” that map 
is necessarily a generalized one that incorporates signposted alternative 
routes and unmarked trails along with its conventional paths. That is to 
say, in keeping with the plasticity of mind that emerged as humans began 
to craft the “cognitive niche,” freeing themselves from the vagaries of 
the environment, the pattern of human evolution predicts a movement 
toward independence of mind and hypothetical thought. Furthermore, 
the ESS, which fundamentally enhances human mind by documenting 
independent thought and transforming it into shared information, is 
the cultural-technological ground zero of written literature. Nonexistent 
outside of this storage and retrieval system, literature not only relies on 
but amplifies it. Its special use, therefore, is in its function as both an 
extension of and contribution to mind, one that expands our capacity 
for narrative and metaphorical thought, that augments consciousness, 
and that offers hypothetical, interpretable experience.
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Donald claims that with the developments of reading and film, the 
mind comes under the control of the ESS: “biological memory is, more 
and more, unable to draw on its own experiences without reference 
to the ESS.”35 Without symbolic systems, the constraints of short term 
memory, even allowing for enhanced memory through the shared, mutu-
ally supporting structures of human social groups, limit prospective and 
retrospective thought. The increasing refinement and sophistication of 
early symbolic systems over about eight thousand years ultimately led 
to alphabetic writing, which unites auditory and visuographic cogni-
tive processes. Donald suggests that pictorial representations gradually 
evolved into symbols about 8,500 BC in Sumeria. Early symbolic systems, 
including accounting systems, lists, and syllabaries (loose collections of 
symbols), remained visuographic for many thousands of years, lacking 
any correlation with the spoken word. These systems, which required 
the memorization of large numbers of symbols, put a high demand on 
memory, inevitably limiting literacy and discouraging creativity among 
those who used them. The invention of alphabets thus constitutes a 
major breakthrough, for alphabetic writing combines visual symbols 
with phonetic expression, utilizing a limited number of symbols that are 
capable of expressing and storing a broad array of meanings.
Thus, phonetic language and, in time, the printing press, provided 
the necessary technology for literary production. However, the cognitive 
capacities underlying the techniques most central to literature, such as 
figurative expression (including metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche) 
and, most centrally, narrative, are not products of the invention of writing 
and speech but long predate them.36 Narrative is a primary, indispens-
able, and very ancient mode of thought, directly connected to causal 
inferencing. In psychological terms, the ability to place persons, objects, 
and events in sequences and to infer causal relations constitutes narra-
tive cognition.37 Literary theorists might argue that this sort of day-to-day 
narrativity, whereby we walk ourselves through our days—construing our 
work and social activities, our family obligations, our negotiations of the 
roadways and the swimming pool lanes, our conflicts with coworkers, 
our future plans, our memories—that this loose and free-form story-
making, with so many overlapping strands, has little relation to what 
literary scholars mean by “narrative.” But literary narrative entails the 
selection and/or invention of strands of thought-and-action from this 
web of ongoing narrativity. Literary narrative is not separate from, or 
other than, the commonplace narrativity that facilitates our understand-
ing of ourselves, others, and events and that enables us to conceive of 
ourselves and to behave as agents. Literary narrative is the aestheticized 
refinement of the web of everyday narrativity, and it is capable of an 
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extraordinary “making special” and an extension of mind because it is 
embedded in the ESS.
Furthermore, because the ESS enlarges the human mind beyond the 
limits of the physical brain, it likewise supplements and extends conscious-
ness, a process that also relies on narrative cognition. As the most basic 
definitions of consciousness reveal, it is entwined with an organism’s 
relations in time and space, and thus with contiguity and causality, the 
backbone of narrative. In the simplest terms, Antonio Damasio defines 
consciousness as “an organism’s awareness of its own self and surround-
ings” or “a unified mental pattern that brings together the object and 
the self.”38 Musing on the origin of consciousness, Damasio links it with 
primal forms of narrative thought: the organism “[constructs] an account 
of what happens within the organism when the organism interacts with 
an object, be it perceived or recalled, be it within body boundaries (e.g., 
pain) or outside them (e.g., a landscape). This account is a simple nar-
rative without words.”39 Thus, the impulse behind the emergence and 
persistence of consciousness in the species—to construct a sequential and 
causal understanding of self-and-environment—appears closely related 
to the strong evidence of narrative thought and action in literature.
Recently, several evolutionary and cognitive theorists have highlighted 
an important function of literature, maintaining that narrative simula-
tions provide practice for real-world experience. For instance, the ad-
aptationist literary scholar Joseph Carroll, building on the speculations 
of evolutionary biologist E. O. Wilson, proposes a general theory of art 
around the concept of scenario building.40 Along the same lines, Lisa 
Zunshine insists on the cognitive efficacy of reader projection into hypo-
thetical situations, emphasizing particularly that fiction hones the ability 
to glean the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others.41 For example, 
following Carroll’s theory, Pat Barker’s Regeneration Trilogy strengthens 
and diversifies neural networks via simulated experience of soldiers in 
World War I and the doctors who treated them for shell shock. These 
neural networks attest to the diversification of cognition via hypothetical 
experience. Following Zunshine’s theory, the conversational niceties in 
Jane Austen’s novels allow readers to infer the intentions and beliefs of 
characters and in the process attune their understanding of the minds 
of real persons. 
In my view, both theorists point to an important (though not the only) 
function of literature in the present day, one that, while not directly 
instrumental, is highly useful. Because literary works are intentionally 
constructed experiences, they enable readers to engage from a distance 
and thus to reflect on events and character psychology from a position 
of security. If the evolved function of primitive art was to ensure a sense 
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of security and control over experience, then this aspect of art’s ultimate 
cause persists in the immersion in imaginative worlds, which allow us 
to extend consciousness by drawing on domains where we lack direct 
experience. Additionally, the likely cognitive process that facilitated 
human control over the environment harmonizes with the theories of 
Carroll and Zunshine. Planning and goal-oriented action are signature 
features of entry into the cognitive niche, for they are evidence of 
prospective and retrospective thinking rather than responses based on 
immediate conditions alone. Tooby and DeVore maintain that humans 
became capable of performing goal-oriented actions “by conceptually 
abstracting from a situation a model.”42 For example, early humans who 
remembered patterns of animal migration or feeding routines learned 
to place these in a hunting situation model; abstracting from that model, 
they were able to act on it pragmatically (when animals moved toward 
the water hole at dusk, for instance). In developing situation models, 
in short, humans draw on experience-based knowledge and organize it 
in rudimentary narrative form. These models, in turn, are cognitively 
available as flexible plans for immediate or prospective action. It seems 
quite likely, then, that the cognitive skill and complexity brought by 
higher cognition ultimately resulted in the evolution of fictional, “as 
if” mental products, situation models at a mental remove from reality.
Indeed, evolutionary psychology offers an adaptive explanation for 
the emergence of imaginative experience and its indirectly instrumen-
tal status, and this too lends weight to the view that literary experience 
hones cognitive understanding and may, in some cases, be practically 
applicable. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby propose that as our human 
ancestors came to inhabit the cognitive niche and simultaneously con-
fronted the complexities of a changing environment, they needed to 
sort globally true from contingently true information, and they needed 
to reason counterfactually. (It is globally true that all animals die and 
rain makes you wet, but only contingently true that small purple-blue 
berries are a good food source. It might be true that if your group had 
traveled through the woods rather than skirting them, you would have 
saved yourselves from overexposure but taken on the risk of unknown 
dangers.) Cosmides and Tooby suggest that humans developed the cogni-
tive ability to track true and false information separately, concomitantly 
surrendering a naïve realism. In their words, “Managing these new types 
of information . . . involved the evolution of new information formats 
. . . [and cognitive tagging and tracking of] the boundaries within 
which a given set of representations can safely be used for inference or 
action.”43 Whereas oral literature is a relatively simple extension of this 
cognitive apparatus for simulation, written literature is a quite elaborate 
extension of it.
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As the above remarks suggest, theories of literature as scenario build-
ing and mind reading have much to offer; however, by themselves they 
are biased toward narrative forms and may also tend to literalize the 
operations of imaginative texts. The technical ability to encode and store 
linguistic constructs results in an endgame with language and form and 
indicates these theories do not cover all the bases of literature’s evolved 
function. A fascinating irony of written literature is that, once words are 
fixed on the page—and thereby entered into the ESS—they are open 
to inspection and interpretation. Paradoxically, as words become set in 
stone, so to speak, their recorded nature lends itself to a proliferation 
of meaning and, in relatively short order, to the construction of new 
kinds of texts whose authors intend a proliferation of meanings. At 
first blush, this might all seem rather unnatural from an evolutionary 
perspective. How can such apparently superflous complexity issue from 
an evolutionary function? An organism must make a ready assessment 
of its environment and take prompt action. Has a cultural artifact that 
revels in interpretive ambiguities severed itself from human nature and 
the evolved function of the arts?
Everyday living is an interpretive process, and both in the present 
and past it presents us with ambiguities. Literary scholarship has been 
hindered by the assumption that meaning-construction is essentially 
textual, rather than a fundamental life process that we, to borrow Dis-
sanayake’s terms, make special or elaborate in literary texts. This belief 
is, to a great extent, understandable. Because humans in general, like 
other organisms, are better served by directing their attention outward 
than inward, they are generally not conscious of being continuously 
engaged in meaning-making processes. In the interests of survival, as 
neuroscientists and philosophers recognize, perception, cognition, and 
consciousness are predominantly directed away from the self.44 Addition-
ally, literary scholars in particular are apt to think of meaning as solely a 
feature of language, a technology that can both clarify and complicate 
semantic procedures. Be that as it may, the construction of meaning is a 
routine matter. Noting the movements of the ceiling fans on my balcony, 
the quivering magnolia branches outside my window, and the telltale 
sheen in the sky, I infer (without turning on the television to confirm my 
meanings) that Tropical Storm Karen has approached the Gulf Coast.
 As humans entered the cognitive niche and untethered themselves 
from the features of delimited locales, they needed to construct new 
meanings from the aspects of unfamiliar environments. Thus, over the 
course of human evolution, the increasing complexity of meaning-
construction proceeded hand-in-hand with the emergence of higher 
intelligence. One great advantage of imaginative literature is that invites 
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our powers of meaning construction in a safe domain that allows our 
interpretive powers to range freely. But more than this, imaginative 
literature makes us conscious of what we automatically tend to forget: 
that we are active interpreters of that reality, and that we normally enlist 
cognitive procedures that have a general, but certainly not a compre-
hensive, efficacy. 
If art is a mode of action that evolved under challenges to survival, 
the abstract nature of written literature constitutes an aesthetic form 
suitable to the complexity of human experience under modernization. 
Developing as an integral aspect of culture, art offers, as Dewey suggests, 
intentionally constructed experience that results in a sense of comple-
tion. Conferring a sense of completeness and control, aesthetic experi-
ence offers a psychic arena where opportunities for meaning-making 
proliferate. This is perhaps particularly true of written literature, since 
the abstractions of language sever it from direct sensory experience, and 
since language is a symbolic system facilitating interpretive procedures. 
In light of Donald’s speculation that language evolved for the unification 
of thought and knowledge, the use of literary forms to create complex 
significance—and thus to complicate thought and knowledge—sug-
gests that a primary function of literature today is to prevent excessive 
unification of thought and knowledge, which cannot serve the needs 
of a complex culture. 
Pragmatic theories traditionally have ethical implications, as Abrams’s 
definition indicates: they “[look] at the work of art chiefly as a means 
to an end, an instrument for getting something done, and [tend] to 
judge its value according to its success in achieving that aim.” An evolu-
tionary approach to the function of art relieves the critic of the ethical 
focus indicated in the tradition, since it begins with a much more basic 
question: why do we have literature at all? My remarks in this essay 
point to functions that have transformed considerably in their entwined 
relation with evolving culture but that are still robust today. One use of 
literary studies, as opposed to literature itself, is to increase the efficacy 
of meaning-making processes and the conscious awareness of humans 
as interpreters of their reality by teaching a rich tradition of literary 
works and engaging in communal interpretation. We may even be able 
to convince some administrators that what is not directly instrumental 
is, nonetheless, a central feature of our species’ survival.
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